Intraday movements in the yen/dollar rate are examined over the 1980-86 period using opening and closing quotes in the New York and Tokyo markets.
INTRODUCTION
The behavior of asset returns in terms of both their predictability and their relation to economic fundamentals has received considerable attention. For exchange rates, a common efficient marketsrational expectations view is that most rate movements are unpredictable, and these unpredictable movements result from news about economic fundamentals (e.g., Mussa 1979 , Dornbusch 1980 , and Frenkel 1981 . Different aspects of this view, however, have been questioned either empirically or theoretically.
-First, while some portion of-longer-run movements in exchange rates may potentially be predictable using forward premiums or interest-rate differentials, for example, very short-run movements should approximately follow a random walk. The results of filter rule studies, however, suggest that short-run movements are partially predictable and can be exploited to generate excess returns (e.g., Bilson 1981 , Dootey and Shafer 1983 , and Sweeney 1986 . Based on studies of this type, Meese (1986) hypothesizes that the profitability of filter rules rises as the sampling frequency of the data increases. Alternative hypotheses leading to such predictable movements can be taken from recent studies in U.S. stock returns. Following Fama and French (1988) and Poterba and Summers (1987) , one hypothesis is that exchange rates exhibit mean reversion, implying predictable offsetting movements. Another hypothesis is that exchange rate movements have inertia (i.e., positive correlation), which corresponds to the results of Lo and MacKinlay (1987) for weekly stock returns.
Second, a number of studies do not reject the hypothesis that exchange rates sometimes reflect speculative bubbles (e.g., Meese 1986 , Evans 1986 , and Woo 1987 . In these instances, exchange rates supposedly diverge from their fundamental values for significant periods of time before the bubble bursts. The leptokurtic distributions of daily exchange rate changes (e.g., McFarland, Pettit, and Sung 1982, and Friedman and Vandersteel 1982) also are taken as evidence that large jumps occur too frequently, perhaps reflecting sudden shifts back to fundamental values. Large jumps also can potentially be characterized as resulting from over-reaction, a hypothesis analogous to that proposed by Shiller (1981) for U.S. stock returns.
-Third, short-run movements in asset prices and returns, including exchange rates, may simply be characterized as noise (e.g., Black 1986, and DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldman 1987) .
That is, while noise trading could cause persistent speculative bubbles in exchange rates, such trading also may result in short-run random movements away from fundamental values. These movements, then, would not be expected to have any information content of their own. Announcement studies do, however, indicate that at least some short-run movements in exchange rates can be linked to unanticipated changes in economic fundamentals. Cornell (1982 Cornell ( , 1983 , Frankel and Hardouvelis (1985) , Engel and Frankel (1984) , Hardouvelis (1984) , and Roley (1987a) , among others, find that U.S. money announcements affect daily exchange rate movements. Hakkio and Pearce (1985) and Ito and Roley (1987) consider additional economic announcements and find significant effects on more finelysampled intraday exchange rate movements.
The purpose of this paper is to examine intraday movements in the yen/dollar exchange rate in terms of their predictability, behavior around large jumps, and information content." The yen/dollar rate is particularly useful to examine these properties For at least two reasons. One is that New York and Tokyo currency markets are open during nonoverlapping hours. So, with the daily opening and closing quotes collected from each market, the behavior of the New York and Tokyo markets can be compared. A second reason is that during the 1980-1986 sample period considered here, different policy regimes emanating from both the U.S. and Japan were announced. Among these policy changes, Japan made significant moves to liberalize capital market restrictions further. As a result, the daily behavior of the yen/dollar rate over policy regimes may be different, and these potential differences can be analyzed as well.
Following this introductory section, the second section summarizes the data used to investigate the behavior of intraday yen/dollar rate movements. The various subsamples used, corresponding to different policy regimes in both the U.S. and Japan, also are discussed. In the third section, the predictability of intraday yen/dollar rate movements is tested. The null hypothesis in these tests is that intraday movements Follow a random walk. An analysis of large jumps in the yen/dollar rate is presented in the fourth section. Hypotheses relating to both bubbles and over-reaction are considered.
In the fifth section, the information content of intraday movements is empirically examined. This is accomplished by estimating the effects of changes in the yen/dollar rate on U.S. and Japanese stock To take into account the effects of changes in policy and deregulation on intraday yen/dollar exchange rate movements, several possible break points are considered within the 1980-86 sample.
First, in December 1980, sweeping deregulation occurred with respect to Japanese capital controls both into and out of Japan." Second, in October 1982, the Federal Resrve announced the abandonment of its previous monetary-controt procedure and also indicated that targets for the narrowty-defined money stock (Ml) would be dc-emphasized. Third, in February 1984. the Federal Reserve adopted a different reserve requirement system, and as a consequence the behavior of money and interest rates in the U.S. may have changed.' Also in 1984, further efforts were made to liberalize Japanese capital markets (Frankel 1984) . Because of the closeness of these separate events in 1984, any relative effects cannot be distinguished. Finally, in September 1985, the Group of Five (G5) meeting was held which may have led to a concerted effort to depreciate the dollar (see Ito 1987) . However, Feldstein (1986) , among.
others, notes that the dollar had gradually been depreciating for seven months prior to the G5 meeting, and that market forces may have been at least as important in causing the dollar's subsequent slide.
Any of the above policy changes may have not only affected onshore credit markets, but also the stochastic behavior of exchange rates. Indeed, Roley (1987a) and Ito and Roley (1987) find significant differences across regimes for the response of the yen/dollar rate to economic news. As a consequence, the behavior of the yen/dollar rate will be considered for both the entire 1980-86 sample and the subsamples implied by potential changes in policy regimes. variances can be rejected. As a whole, these results support the notion that changes in policy regimes altered the stochastic behavior or the yen/dollar rate. Moreover, the stochastic behavior appears to differ across markets. These data are examined in much more detail in the sections that follow.
III. PREDICTABILITY OF INTRADAY YEN/DOLLAR RATE MOVEMENTS
In this section, the predictability of intraday yen/dollar rate movements is examined.
Predictability is considered with respect to the three previous intraday movements, day-of-week effects, and previous large jumps of one percentage point or more. The magnitude of the predicted changes also is considered.
A plausible null hypothesis for intraday exchange rate movements is that they follow a random walk. Consider, for example, the expected change in the exchange rate implied by uncovered interest parity:
= natural logarithm of the yen/dollar rate in period t, it,i = annualized one-period interest rates, in percent, in Japan and the U.S., respectively, = expectations operator using all public information at time t, C = parameter to adjust the differences in units between percentage changes in exchange rates and changes in annualized interest rates. 6 For nonzero values of the interest-rate differential, equation (3.1) implies that some portion of future exchange rate movements is predictable. The predictability decreases, however, as the length of time between t and t+1 shortens. In particular if the frequency of measured exchange rate movements is one year, 9 takes a value of unity. If quarterly observations are used, B falls to 1/4. For daily data, 9 equals 1/365. Finally, with the four intraday segments considered here, B is approximately 1/4 of the daily value, or 1/1460. As a consequence, for any plausible value of the Japanese -U.S. interest-rate differential, the intraday predictive ability of the interest differential is approximately zero. Over the 1980-86 period, for example, 3-month dollar-denominated and yen-denominated interest rates were most disparate in mid-1981, at about 12 percentage points. Assuming that the daily interest-rate differential also peaked at about 12 percentage points, the implied daily dollar depreciation was 0.03 percent. At a level of 230 yen/dollar, which was the case then, the interest differential predicted dollar depreciation of about 0.07 yen each day. With four intraday segments, the implied dollar depreciation was only about 0.008 percent per segment, or 0.018 yen. The magnitude of this movement is well below the bid-ask spread, which had a minimum value of 0.05 yen in the New York market over the 1980-86 sample.
Other representations of exchange rates also should imply random-walk behavior over very short time periods, although not necessarily over longer periods (e.g., Hakkio 1986 A constant term is included in the specification to capture a variety of possible effects from either systematic measurement errors in the variables across markets, small average predictable movements, or small average predictable changes in the risk premium. The next three terms, -i' 'i-2' and As.3, are included to test the predktability of intraday yen/dollar rate movements based on the three most recent intraday movements. The movement in European markets, for example, may have an inertia effect on the within-the-market change in New York. Alternatively, the yen/dollar rate may over-react to news in the Tokyo market, and such movements may be partially offset in the subsequent European segment of the day. Positive values for the b3 imply inertia effects, while negative values reflect mean reversion.
• The remaining variables in equation (3.2) allow fixed day-of-week effects and separate effects from large jumps in the yen/dollar rate of 1 percent or more in previous segments. Several studies have estimated significant day-of-week effects for exchange rates as well as other assets (e.g., Levi 1978 , French 1980 , Gibbons and Hess 1981 , and McFarland, Pettit, and Sung 1982 . Equation (3.2) allows effects different from Monday effects, which are embedded in the constant term. Previous large jumps are included to allow any special inertia or mean reversion effects associated with such unusual events.
Large jumps are examined more closely in the next section.
As a preliminary test of the random walk hypothesis, the intraday yen/dollar rate data also are tested for the presence of a single unit root (e.g., Meese and Singleton 1982) . The specification used for this test is
where t is a time trend and the other variables are as defined previously. The null hypothesis examined is H0 b=0, b'=l, and the marginal significance levels are taken from Dickey and Fuller (1981) , Table VLW A
. Estimation and Test Results
The estimation results for a restricted version of equation (3.2) along with various test results are summarized in Tables 3, 4 , 5, and 6 For the Tokyo, European, New York, and Pacific markets, respectively. The results are reported for the entire sample and selected subsamples corresponding to possible policy regimes." The middle of each of these tables gives the results for the unit root test.
The reported statistics indicate that the hypothesis that a single unit root is present can be rejected at the 5 percent level in only two of 20 cases for the four markets across the five subsarnples. The rejections occur in the last subsample in the European market and in the first subsample in the Pacific market. This hypothesis also can be rejected for the overall sample in the Pacific market. As a whole, however, the first-differenced specification (3.2) appears to be justified."
The top halves of each of the tables report estimation results for equation (3.2) with the restriction c = d3 = 0 (j=1,2,3,4). That is, the effects of only the three previous intraday segments are considered.1 For the Tokyo market, significant mean reversion relative to the Pacific segment is estimated in three of five subsamples. In the first period, for example, the estimated coefficient indicates that about 41 percent of the movement during the Pacific segment is offset in the Tokyo market. Again, the Pacific segment is represented by the difference in the opening Tokyo quote in day and the 4:30 p.m. quote in New York in day t-1. Because there are not formal opening and closing times in the New York market, most of the observed movements during the Pacific segment most likely reflect movements in New York after the 4:30 p.m. quote.' Consistent with this view, significant mean reversion in the Tokyo market relative to the New York market also is estimated in two of the five subsamples. In constrast, a significant inertia effect is estimated with respect to the previous group in predicting subsequent movements in the Tokyo market are reported in the second row of tests in Table 3 . These tests are performed using the heteroscedasticity-consisteut covariance matrix proposed by White (198O) ." The test results indicate that the three previous segments are significant at the 5 percent level in three of the live periods and for the overall sample. Thus, the hypothesis that the yen/dollar rate follows a random walk in the Tokyo market can generally be rejected.
Jn contrast to the results for the Tokyo market, the results for the European segment of the day in Table 4 do not indicate mean-reverting behavior. Instead, significant inertia effects from the New York market are estimated in three subsamples. Moreover, inertia with respect to the Tokyo market is statistically significant in period I. The hypothesis that the effects of the three previous segments as a group equal zero can be rejected in the first two periods as well as in the overall sample.
The results for the New York market in Table 5 are similar to those of the European market in that the random walk model can be rejected in the first two periods and in the overall sample. They differ, however, in that the results once again suggest statistically significant meau-reverting behavior, this time with respect to the previous movement in the European market in periods I and II. During period I, a large and significant inertia effect with respect to the Tokyo market also is estimated.
Finally, the results for the Pacific segment of the day suggest a mixture of mean reversion and inertia with respect to movements during previous segments. For this segment, the random walk hypothesis can be rejected in three periods and in the overall sample. In contrast to the other three markets, the random walk model is rejected in the last subsample, which begins in September 1985.
As indicated in Tables 3, 4 , 5, and 6, day-of-week dummies are statistically significant in only two instances other than in the Pacific segrnent}" This also is the only segment that spans weekends, which may account for the significance of day-of-week effects in two subsamples as well as the overall sample in the Pacific market. The results in the tables additionally indicate that large jumps in the yen/dollar rate only ha''e effects significantly different from the other movements of less than 1 percent in three of the 20 possible cases for the five subsamples. Because of the relatively small number of such large jumps however, it may not be possible to isolate their effects in this particular specification.
Several other issues relating to the results in Tables 3, 4 , 5, and 6 also deserve mention. First, the inclusion of both day-of-week dummies and possible separate effects of large jumps do not eliminate the excess kurtosis found in previous studies (e.g., McFarland, Pettit, and Sung 1982, and Friedman and Vandersteel 1982) . This departure from the normal distribution, however, should not significantly bias the reported test statistics (e.g., Miller 1986). Second, the presence of large jumps of 1 percent or more in both the current and lagged segments have little effect on the estimation and test results.
That is, outliers are not responsible for the significant departures from the random walk model The cutoff point in the tables is taken as 0.10 yen, the typical bid-ask spread. The results for the New York market in Table 5 , for example, show that 148 of the 208 observations in period I have absolute predicted changes greater than 0.10 yen. By the fifth period, however, no fitted values are greater than 0.10 yen. This same pattern is generally repeated in the Tokyo and European markets, but not in the Pacific segment, For the other three markets, however, the results may be interpreted as support for the assertion that as the market becomes large and more traders (speculators) participate in it, the predictable portion of future price movements diminishes.U'
IV. LARGE JUMPS IN THE EXCHANGE RATE
The behavior of the yen/dollar rate around large intraday jumps of at least 1 percent is examined more closely in this section. Large jumps in asset prices often capture the attention of the news media, and several common stories are encountered about movements following a jump. One is that the price (exchange rate) declined, for example, because of "profit-taking" after a sharp rise.
Another is that the large jump itself represents over-reaction to relevant news, and the subsequent decline merely moves the price back toward its equilibrium level. In any. event, there seems to be a view, at least in the news media, that any large change in an asset's price is followed by a movement in the opposite direction. There also is a view, which is not mutually exclusive, that sharp changes in the price reflect the last stage of a bubble (or a bandwagon effect) in which the bubble bursts. A large change by itself, however, is not evidence of a bubble. It may simply be reflecting some major news in the world, such as the sudden death of a political leader, initiation of war in the Middle East, or a major change in economic policy. Nevertheless, the profit-taking, over-reaction1 and bubble views suggest that days around and including large price changes should be treated separately from other days.
The top part of Table 7 lists the number of times in which the yen/dollar rate jumped by more than 1 percent in each market. From Table 1 , a change of 1 percent is more than two standard deviations. By selecting the infrequent days with jumps of more than 1 percent, special characteristics can be examined.
To examine large jumps initially, suppose that the exchange rate could deviate from an otherwise stationary stochastic process for some period of time in the manner considered by Blanchard and Watson (1982) . A rational bubble could then emerge and burst occasionally. That is, this bubble hypothesis for a large change within a day is that the jump is caused by the final stage of a bubble or a bandwagon effect. A large jump can then be interpreted as a sudden correction to the natural (equilibrium) level from an exploding bubble process. This interpretation predicts that the large jump is preceded by a significant change in the opposite direction. Formally, The other specification considered involves the hypothesis that large jumps are partially offset in the subsequent segment because of either profit-taking or mean-reversion following over-reaction.
Under this hypothesis, the subsequent movement is not necessarily large, but it is in the opposite direction regardless of the reason for the jump. This behavior can be represented as The empirical results for intraday segments with large jumps are summarized in the bottom part of Table 7 . The results for equation (4.1) indicate that there is very little evidence that large jumps are preceded by cumulative changes in the opposite direction. While the estimated coefficients are negative, they are not statistically significant at high marginal significance levels. Large jumps, therefore, cannot be identified as the popping of a bubble. In contrast, there is some evidence that a portion of a large jump is offset in the subsequent segment. The first row of results for this specification indicates that a positive jump of 1 percent, for example, is partially offset by a 0.13 percent decline in the yen/dollar rate during the next segment of the day. For jumps greater than 1.25 and 1.5 percent, however, the next two rows in the table do not report statistically significant effects.
Thus, the segments following the 27 largest jumps in the sample do not exhibit significant meanreverting behavior.
V. INFORMATION CONTENT OF EXCHANGE RATE MOVEMENTS
The information content of the intraday movements in the yen/dollar rate is examined in this section. In this respect, the information content of short-run movements is interpreted as the degree to which such movements reflect changes in fundamental factors. In turn, changes in fundamental factors might be expected to affect not only exchange rates, but other asset prices as well. Given the results in previous sections. where intraday yen/dollar rate movements both sometimes failed to follow the predicted random walk model and indicated offsetting movements following large jumps, the information content of yen/dollar rate movements may be questioned.
To estimate the information content of yen/dollar rate movements, the responses of both U.S.
and Japanese stock prices are considered.Th' One advantage in using stock prices for thispurpose is that equity markets are often characterized as being efficient in terms of processing new information quickly. So, if intraday movements in the yen/dollar rate reflect relevant information, stock prices would be expected to respond within a day.
The effects of exchange rate movements in three of the four intraday segments on stock prices are considered for both the U.S. and Japanese stock markets. All lour segments cannot be examined for each stock market because of contemporaneous trading in the foreign exchange and stock markets.
Nevertheless, the formal opening and closing times of the New York Stock Exchange are ideal in capturing the effects of three of the segments since New York stock trading begins at 9:30 a.m. and ends at 4:00 p.m.'1 In contrast, the yen/dollar rate quotes in New York are collected at 9:00 a.m. and 4:30 p.m. Thus, it is possible to construct movements in stock prices that capture the information content of the exchange rate. In particular, exchange rate movements are measured from 4:30 p.m. on the previous business day to 9:00 a.m. on the current business day. This time interval includes the Pacific, Tokyo, and European exchange rate segments. Stock prices are measured from the previous day's close at 4:00 p.m. to the current day's close. Exchange rate movements are therefore measured when the New York stock market is closed. This new information should be reflected in stock prices when the market opens at 9:30 a.m., and continue to be reflected at the 4:00 p.m. close. This procedure nevertheless omits a relevant segment from 9:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. in New York. However, a variety of major U.S. economic announcements, including those for the consumer price index, producer price index, industrial production, and the unemployment rate, are made at 9:00 a.m. or earlier.
Moreover, the information content of this segment is considered for the Tokyo stock market.
For the Tokyo stock market, the opening time is 9:00 a.m. and the market closes at 3:00 p.m.
Analogous to the measured change in the New York stock market, daily changes from the 3:00 p.m.
close are used to examine the information content of three exchange rate segments. In this case, however, the three segments represent the Pacific, New York, and European currency markets. As before, currency trading in the three segments occurs when the Tokyo stock market is closed.
The specifications used to estimate the response of stock prices to intraday movements in the yen/dollar rate can be represented as and the other variables, which were defined previously, also are in natural logarithms multiplied by 100. In addition to these basic specifications, the separate effects of large intraday jumps in the yen/dollar rate are considered, as well as possible day-of-week effects iii the two stock markets, in a manner analogous to equation (3.2)•W Finally, the random error terms, et. reflect movements in stock prices from the closing quotes on day t-1 to the closing quotes on day t not due to the measured changes in the exchange rate along with the response to new information from the opening of the stock markets to the closing on day t. Under the efficient markets hypothesis, this latter component is orthogonal to the measured changes in the yen/dollar rate in equations (5.1) and (5.2).
The estimation results for equation (5.1) are presented in Table 8 . The results indicate that the estimated response of U.S. stock prices is negative with respect to each segment in each subsample.th'
That is, dollar appreciation over these periods was associated with bad news for the U.S. stock market.
The hypothesis that the responses to movements in the three segments as a group equal zero (b1 = b2 = b3 = 0), however, can be rejected only for the complete sample and the second subsample. The results also suggest that yen/dollar rate movements in the Tokyo market contain little or no information. The estimated response of U.S. stock prices to these movements is insignificantly different from zero in every subsample. In contrast, for the entire sample, movements in both Europe (NYO -TKC) and Pacific (TRO -NYC1) segments provide information. In the case of the Pacific segment1 the information may simply be the result of trading in New York after the 4:30 p.m. quote used here.
The test results in the table also suggest that infrequent large jumps in the yen/dollar rate in recent years had extraordinary effects on U.S. stock prices in three of the subsamples, but not in the overall sample. the hypothesis that the response to the three segments as a group equals zero can be rejected in periods III, IV, and the overall sample. Also, the responses to jumps in the exchange rate are significantly different from the other estimated responses only in the first period.
As a whole1 the results from both the U.S. and Japanese stock markets suggest that short-run movements in the yen/dollar rate contain some relevant information. As a consequence, at least part of these movements can be rationalized in terms of fundamental factors and not simply noise.
Moreover, during the 1980-86 sample period, changes in the implied underlying fundamental factors led to a negative relationship between the yen/dollar rate and the stock market in each country. One possible factor consistent with this result is world oil prices. An unanticipated rise in oil prices, for example, adversely affects both economies, but such a rise has a larger negative effect on Japan since it imports 99 percent of its oil. As a consequence, both stock markets could fall, and the dollar might appreciate in value relative to the yen. The significant negative relationship between Tokyo stock prices and yen/dollar rate movements in the European segment would appear to support this hypothesis, as major world oil markets are trading during this part of the day. Another possible factor is U.S. money announcements. In the case of a positive money announcement surprise, for example, empirical evidence suggests that U.S. real interest rates rise, the dollar appreciates in foreign exchange markets, and U.S. stock prices fall.1 In response, the Japanese central bank may raise interest rates to moderate dollar appreciation, resulting in a similar decline in Japanese stock prices.
VI. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
Intraday movements in the yen/dollar exchange rate were examined in this paper. The availability of daily opening and closing quotes in both the New York and Tokyo markets allowed four segments to be considered. These segments corresponded to currency trading in Tokyo, European, New
York, and Pacific markets.
Several aspects of the daily movements in the four markets were examined. First, the random walk behavior of intraday movements was tested. Random walk behavior was rejected in about half of the five subsamples considered during the 1980-86 period. The economic significance of the departures from the random walk model declined, however, during the latter part of the sample. Second, the behavior of the yen/dollar rate in segments immediately before and after large jumps was investigated.
The empirical results suggested that large jumps themselves could not be characterized as final stages of speculative bubbles. The results did indicate, however, mean reversion in the segment following a large jump. Finally, the information content of the intraday movements was considered in terms of their effect on U.S. and Japanese stock prices. The results suggested that yen/dollar rate movements of less than one day contain relevant information. As a consequence, intraday movements cannot simply be characterized as noise. Based on the profitability of filter rules on daily data, Meese (1986, pg. 346) states that "it would appear that a major omission of empirical academic research has been to ignore analysis of intraday exchange rate movements... ." This paper attempts to fill part of this void.
2.
See Ito (1986) for an analysis of the effect of the December 1980 changes on covered interest parity.
3.
The effects of these changes in Federal Reserve policy are considered in detail by Roley (1986 Roley ( , 1987b . The response of U.S. interest rates to money announcement surprises is found to change significantly over the different regimes.
4.
As reported in Ito and Roley (1987) , correcting these data for differences in the number of hours in each segment does not alter these qualitative results or the test results reported in Table 2 . In Ito and Roley (1987) , however, changes in the yen/dollar rate are considered, as opposed to the percentage changes used in Table 1 . Corrections for the number of hours are riot made here since the actual data used later correspond to those reported in Tables 1 and 2. 5.
See Ito (1988) for tests which support uncovered interest parity for the case of the yen/dollar rate.
6.
The test results are qualitatively unchanged for the null hypothesis involving only b' = 1. Also, and s1 in equation (3.3) are multiplied by 100.
7.
Observations involving national holidays in each country are deleted, but observations spanning weekends are included.
8.
While the other testsreported below use White's (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix in cases where the estimated standard errors increase using this procedure, the reported results for the unit-root tests are not adjusted. In the other tests, the heteroscedasticity correction does not significantly alter the test results, so it seems likely that corrections to the unit-root tests also would not change the results appreciably. If heteroscedasticity was apparent, however, procedures proposed by Phillips (1987) should probably be used.
9.
A complete set of estimation and test results for various subcases of equation (3.2) is available as a supplement from the authors. In general, the results are not sensitive to the exclusion or inclusion of a particular set of variables. Specifications excluding the most recent lagged segment also were estimated to consider the effects of possible spurious correlation due to measurement errors, particularly in moving from quotes in the New York market to quotes in the Tokyo market, and vice versa. Tests of the significance of lagged segments changed only slightly in these specifications. In particular, the results in Tables 4 and 5 are the same, while in Table 6 lagged segments are significant in period III at the 5 percent level but not in period I. In Table 3 , lagged segments in periods III and IV are no longer significant as a group at the 5 percent level, but they are significant at the 7 percent level.
10.
This feature may be important for at least one day each week because of the effects of U.S. money announcements, which were made either at 4:10 p.m., 4:15 p.m., or 4:30 pm. over different subsamples.
11. White's (1980) correction is used for the same tests in Tables 4, 5, and 6 as well. Moreover, the day-of-week dummies test uses this covariance matrix. However, the jumps test reported in Tables 3, 4 , 5, and 6 does not. In general, the test statistics for the jumps test are higher using White's procedure, so the conservative approach of using the unadjusted covariance matrix was followed.
12.
The hypothesis that the effects of day-of-week dummies equal zero is tested in equation (3.2) under the restriction that d1 = dz = d1 = 0. Similarly, the effects of large jumps are tested in equation (3.2) under the restriction that c1 = c2 = c3 = c4 = 0 These tests also were performed in equation (3.2) without any of these restrictions1 and the results were qualitatively the same.
13,
Both of these results again are reported in the supplement available from the authors.
14.
It also should be emphasized that the reported numbers do not necessarily imply anything about the profitability of filter rules. In particular, just fitted values are reported, not the accuracy of the fitted values. The low 17(215 reported in the tables suggest that the' fitted values do not capture much of the variation in actual values. 15. Obstfeld (1985) also uses stock prices to infer the factors affecting exchange rates.
16.
During the earlier subsamples considered here, stock trading began at 10:00 a.m. in New York.
17.
The estimation and test results are not sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of day-of-week dummies, so the reported results are for the specification without these dummies. 18. in the last subsample, however, the estimated response to the cumulative change in the three segments was positive, but insignificantly different from zero, after the yen/dollar rate dropped to about 160.
19.
For evidence that U.S. money announcement surprises cause dollar appreciation, again see the relevant references in the introduction. For evidence on the negative relationship between U.S. money announcement surprises and U.S. stock prices, see Pearce and Roley (1985) . NOTES: Exchange rate movements are measured as changes in natural logarithms, multiplied by 100. If one market is closed because of a holiday, then not only that market, but also adjacent markets becooe missing observations. As a result, the number of observations can differ across markets for the same period. .000
.000 tCTES: The dependent variable in the regressions is the change in the natural logarithm of the Standard & Poors 500 Index, multiplied by 100, from the close in day t-1 to the close in day t. Numbers in parentheses below the estimated coefficients are estimated standard errors, The null hypothesis for the jumps test correspon4s to the specification in the top part of the table.
The test of the significance of exchange rate movements in the three previous segments also is performed in this specification using White's (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix. * Significant at the 5 percent level. NOTES: The dependent variable in the regressions is the change in the natural logarithm of the Nikkei-Doi., 225 Index, multiplied by 100, from the close in day t-l to the close in day t. See the notes in Table 8 . * Significant at the 5 percent level.
